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“‘If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.’ Unless 
you’re losing your children, or your home, or your healthcare . . . .” 
– National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel1 
                                                           
ǂ J.D., 2020 Mitchell Hamline School of Law, magna cum laude. The author is currently 
serving as a judicial law clerk at the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The views expressed in this 
paper are my own and do not reflect those of the judicial branch or the judges whom I serve. 
Many thanks to Judge Slieter for your kind, expert review and graciousness. I wish to extend 
my utmost appreciation for professors Natalie Netzel and Joanna Woolman, for all of your 
guidance in this paper and for your tireless work on behalf of Minnesota’s families. All errors 
in this paper are my own.  
1 NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., http://civilrighttocounsel.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/RR2B-FADJ]. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In dealing with issues of parental representation, states must 
contend with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina.2 The 
Court, using the factors established in Mathews v. Eldridge,3 held that there 
is no constitutional right to counsel for parents in child protection cases.4 
This decision has led states to develop varying statutory schemes for 
parental representation in child protection cases. Differences in statutes by 
state lead to differences in outcomes for parents and children across the 
nation. While there are many factors that contribute to differing outcomes 
in legal disputes, research indicates that states providing representation to 
all parents in child protection proceedings leads to better outcomes for both 
parents and children within their state.  
Arguably, Minnesota has one of the more challenging child 
protection systems for parents to navigate. Emergency Protective Care 
(EPC) hearings are not appealable by right in Minnesota, and the state 
currently does not mandate counsel for parents who, while not indigent, 
may not be able to employ counsel of their own.5 A first step to improving 
Minnesota’s child protection system is to re-evaluate section 260C.163 of 
the Minnesota Statutes,6 which does not afford parents representation as a 
matter of right. Over the course of a child protection proceeding, parents 
are at risk of the state severing their court-recognized fundamental liberty 
interest in the care and custody of their children.7 Children likewise enjoy a 
corresponding liberty interest in being raised by their parents.8 Both 
fundamental liberty interests are placed at unnecessary risk when parents 
are unrepresented in a child protection matter. Attorneys representing 
parents have a crucial impact on protecting these fundamental liberty 
interests. To fully protect the recognized rights of parents and children in 
Minnesota, attorneys should be appointed as a matter of right before 
children are removed from the home. If the state of Minnesota is unable to 
assign representation to parents at or before an EPC hearing to protect its 
citizens’ fundamental liberty interests, EPC hearings should be made 
appealable by right to help alleviate the risk of erroneous removals. 
This Article outlines the groundwork laid by Lassiter v. Department 
of Social Services, in which the Supreme Court held that counsel is not 
constitutionally required in matters of civil litigation.9 It next examines the 
                                                           
2 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
3 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
4 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33. 
5 MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subdiv. (3)(c) (2020). 
6 Id. 
7 See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
8 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
9 452 U.S. at 3. 
2
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state of parental representation in Minnesota and the fundamental shift in 
parental representation that occurred in 2008 amidst budget shortfalls, the 
effects of which are felt in the state’s representation scheme today. This 
Article then explains what an EPC hearing is and why it is integral that 
Minnesota parents’ be able to appeal decisions made during this hearing if 
they are not assigned counsel before such hearing. Next, this Article argues 
that section 260C.163 of the Minnesota Statutes is unhelpful and provides 
no guidance for judicial discretion when determining whether parents 
receive legal representation, in light of the involved fundamental liberty 
interests of the state’s parents and children. 
This Article posits that to best serve Minnesota’s families, 
representation must be appointed before children are at risk of being 
erroneously removed from their parents. Even when removed from the 
home, children are more likely to be reunified with their parents if parents 
are assigned counsel.10 This Article also offers that parent representation 
could ultimately save the state capital, following the findings of other states 
that mandate representation.11 In conclusion, this Article argues that 
Minnesota families deserve better than the state’s current system of justice 
by geography,12 and that families in Minnesota do not deserve to wait for the 
changes in Minnesota’s child protection system to access equal 
opportunities for justice.  
At the time of publication, the change to section 260C.163 of the 
Minnesota Statutes advocated for within this Article is currently under 
legislative consideration.13 These changes are imperative to increase access 
to justice for Minnesota’s families.  
                                                           
10 See infra Section V.B. 
11 See infra Section V.B. 
12 Minnesota is second-in the nation (following Ohio) of states most heavily funded by a 
county system. Andrea Brubaker, Follow the Money: Child Welfare Funding in MN, CTR. 
FOR ADVANCED STUD. IN CHILD WELFARE (Mar. 6, 2015), 
https://cascw.umn.edu/policy/follow-the-money-child-welfare-funding-in-mn/ 
[https://perma.cc/U9UW-CMUR]. “The State itself provides the least amount of funding for 
child welfare while the counties contribute nearly half.” Id. It is this author’s assertion that 
county-by-county funding of parents’ attorneys may lead to disparate outcomes in child 
protection proceedings within the state, if parents are granted an attorney at all.  
13 See HF 312 Minn. Stat. 260C.163 subdiv. 3. The proposed legislation mandates the 
appointment of counsel before the first hearing, “[i]n all child protection proceedings where 
a child risks removal from the care of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian,” including 
a child in need of protection or services petition (CHIPS), termination of parental rights 
proceedings, and petitions for permanent out-of-home placement. Payment for counsel 
would continue to be at county expense. Id.  
3
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II.  LASSITER V. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES: THE DEATH 
OF CIVIL GIDEON 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lassiter, addressing the right to 
counsel in civil cases, squashed the hope many had for a “civil Gideon.”14 
Lassiter created a presumption against appointing counsel to litigants unless 
their physical liberty is at issue.15 To discover the extent of process 
constitutionally required to meet the standard of “fundamental fairness,” 
Lassiter determined that courts must evaluate and balance the factors 
established in Mathews v. Eldridge.16 These factors are: “the private interests 
at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used 
will lead to erroneous decisions.”17 As the appeal before the Court arose 
from a termination of parental rights, the Court recognized the parent’s 
interest as an “extremely important one.”18 The Court also found that the 
state shared the parent’s interest in reaching accurate decisions in 
termination of parental rights cases.19 When considering the third factor, the 
Court found that the risk of the erroneous deprivation of a parent’s rights 
could, but would not always, be “insupportably high.”20 
After analyzing the Mathews factors as applied to the case before it, 
the Court concluded that such distribution of interests and risk would not 
be present in every child protection case.21 The Court concluded that the 
                                                           
14 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (establishing a criminal defendant’s right 
to counsel) (“[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”). See also Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, 
Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing 
Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 363, 
373 (2005). 
15 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. 
16 Id. at 26–27. 
17 Id. at 27 (citing 424 U.S. at 335). The Mathews test has become ingrained in the Court’s 
assessment of due process and liberty rights. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
529 (2004); Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 482–83 (1986). 
18 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (characterizing the litigants’ interest at 
stake as “the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of 
his or her children”) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). However, while 
the Lassiter court characterized the interest involved as an extremely important one, 
subsequent courts reaffirmed that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in “the care, 
custody, and control of their children . . .” and that this fundamental liberty interest was 
among the oldest recognized by the Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
19 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.  
20 Id.  
21 Id.; hereinafter referred to as the Mathews factors to comport with prior Minnesota 
Supreme Court naming conventions. See State v. Rey, 905 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Minn. 2018) 
(“The three-factor balancing test in Mathews requires us to consider . . .”); T.C.B. v. 
Bergstrom, 845 N.W. 2d 764, 786 (Minn. 2014) (“Thus, if a protected life, liberty, or 
4
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flexibility required under the Due Process Clause would not presume that 
counsel need always be appointed in parental termination proceedings as 
the interests of the state and the parent, as well as the risk of erroneous 
deprivation, vary on a case-by-case basis.22 The Court relied heavily on 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,23 determining that if the risk of deprivation of personal 
liberty is diminished, the right to counsel likewise diminishes.24 In creating 
a barrier to the right to counsel in civil litigation—including matters relating 
to child protection—it left such matters in the hands of individual state 
legislatures. The Court did note, however, that “a wise public policy . . . may 
require that higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable 
under the Constitution” and that “[i]nformed opinion has clearly come to 
hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel 
not only in parental termination proceedings, but in dependency and 
neglect proceedings as well.”25 The Court has not re-examined the issue after 
its 1981 decision in Lassiter.26 
In general, the state of civil representation has not improved since 
the Court’s decision in Lassiter when considering issues such as funding or 
public access to the civil justice system. Federal funding of legal services in 
the United States has declined by fifty percent over the last quarter century.27 
In the 2019 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, the United States tied 
for 30 out of 126 countries listed when measuring “accessibility and 
affordability of civil justice.”28 The National Coalition for a Civil Right to 
Counsel indicates that between 2015 and 2019, the United States fell by 
                                                           
property interest is at stake, we must weigh the Mathews factors to determine what type of 
process is constitutionally due to a person deprived of such an interest.”). 
22 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.  
23 411 U.S. 778 (1973). The Lassiter dissent later attempted to distinguish Gagnon by noting 
that Gagnon involved merely the revocation of probation procedures, whereas a termination 
of parental rights is “distinctly formal and adversarial.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 42 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting).  
24 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26. 
25 Id. at 33–34.  
26 Dennis A. Kaufman, The Tipping Point on the Scales of Civil Justice, 25 TOURO L. REV. 
347, 347 (2009). 
27 NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., Backdrop: The Access to Justice Crisis, 
http://civilrighttocounsel.org/about/history [https://perma.cc/X5QL-9Z4P].  
28 THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 2019 
28 (2019). With respect to civil justice, the report measured “the accessibility and 
affordability of civil courts, including whether people are aware of available remedies; can 
access and afford legal advice and representation; and can access the court system without 
incurring unreasonable fees, encountering unreasonable procedural hurdles, or experiencing 
physical or linguistic barriers.” Id. at 13. It is perhaps important to note that more countries 
declined than improved in overall performance, indicating globally weaker rule of law. Id. at 
6–7.  
5
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over forty places when measuring access to and affordability of civil 
litigation.29 
III.  MINNESOTA’S REPRESENTATION SCHEME 
It is not in the scope of this Article to argue whether Lassiter was 
properly decided.30 A quarter century after the Court’s decision in Lassiter, 
the American Bar Association’s (ABA) house of delegates unanimously 
decided that it was indeed wise public policy to rise above the constitutional 
floor established by Lassiter.31 In 2006, the ABA voted to provide public 
counsel as a matter of right, at public expense, to low-income persons in 
certain adversarial proceedings.32 Such proceedings identified by the ABA 
included those “where basic human needs are at stake, such as those 
involving . . . child custody.”33 
The Constitution is the backbone of criminal justice reform in the 
United States.34 Such reform included the constitutionally mandated 
                                                           
29 U.S. Rank on Access to Civil Justice in Rule of Law Index Drops to 108th out of 128 
Countries, NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS. (Mar. 10, 2020), 
http://civilrighttocounsel.org/major_developments/217 [https://perma.cc/B2BQ-WA4X]. 
30 While this article does not argue that Lassiter should be overturned, many other articles 
eloquently make the argument that parents should have the right to representation under the 
Due Process Clause of the constitution. See, e.g., Tom Pryor, Turner v. Rogers, the Right to 
Counsel, and the Deficiencies of Mathews v. Eldridge, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1854, 1857–60 
(2013) (exploring the history and application of the Due Process Clause with respect to 
procedural matters, particularly the right to counsel). “When the state is in reality the 
opposing party and when the interests of the indigent litigant, although not involving his 
personal liberty, are fundamental and compelling, due process and fundamental fairness 
require a presumption in favor of appointed counsel.” William L. Dick, Jr., The Right to 
Appointed Counsel for Indigent Civil Litigants: The Demands of Due Process, 30 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 627, 628 (1989) (arguing that in termination of parental rights proceedings 
there should be a presumption of a parents’ right to counsel). But see Kaufman, supra note 
26, at 355 (stating that overruling Lassiter would not create a comprehensive right to counsel 
but could be a first step toward creating such right). 
31 Raven Lidman, Civil Gideon as a Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to Join Step with the 
Rest of the Developed World?, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 769, 769 (2006). 
32 After the vote recommending the appointment of counsel by right to low-income parties in 
child custody cases, ABA President Michael Greco stated, “[E]very poor American, like 
every wealthy American, should have access to a lawyer to protect the fundamental needs of 
human existence.” Id.   
33 Id.  
34 In New York, Chief Judge Janet DiFiore observed that New York’s parental representation 
system “has suffered from many of the same deficiencies that once afflicted our criminal 
defense system, including excessive attorney caseloads, inadequate training, and insufficient 
funding for support staff and services.” KAREN K. PETERS, COMM’N ON PARENTAL LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION, INTERIM REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE 9 (2019). Other reports 
originating from New York state that the impact of parental representation in child protection 
matters is as profound as representation is for persons navigating the criminal justice system. 
6
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provision of counsel as seen in Gideon.35 Lassiter denies such opportunity 
for drastic and widespread reform in the field of child protection. Post-
Lassiter, individual state legislatures must determine if litigants in civil 
matters receive court-appointed representation. Such individual 
determinations of the right to counsel in civil matters have led to the creation 
of a patchwork of rights across the United States.36 
A.  Pre-2008: Public Defenders as Court-Appointed Parent Attorneys in 
Minnesota 
Parents in Minnesota were appointed public defenders in child 
protection matters until 2008.37 The State of Minnesota Board of Public 
Defense (Board) made three requests to the legislature between 2003 and 
2007 for increased funding for parent representation in child protection 
cases.38 Until 2008, Minnesota’s system of parental representation was 
funded by the state. However, massive budget cuts across Minnesota caused 
the state to transition from a state-funded system to a system funded by 
individual counties.39 Given that public defenders are not statutorily 
required to represent parents in child protection matters, the Board of 
Public Defense stopped representing parents in child protection cases in 
July 2008, in light of stark cuts to its budget.40 Three years after Minnesota’s 
                                                           
See N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N COMM. ON FAMILIES AND THE LAW, MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF STATE FUNDING FOR MANDATED PARENTAL REPRESENTATION 3 (2018). 
35 The American Bar Association (ABA) states that public defense is “essential to the 
administration of criminal justice.” The ABA also sets an aspirational standard, directing 
public defenders to work towards reform and improvements in our system of criminal justice. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, 4-1.2(a), (e) (A.B.A., 4th ed. 
2017).  
36 States mandating the appointment of parental counsel have generally done so on due 
process grounds under individual state constitutions, or by using an equal protection 
framework. See Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-
Counsel Decisions, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 186, 191 (2006) 
(analyzing how state courts have considered Lassiter in claims arguing for the appointment 
of counsel in parental representation). 
37 HELEN MEYER, REPORT OF CHILDREN’S JUSTICE INITIATIVE PARENT LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION WORKGROUP TO MINN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 2 (2008). 
38 Id. at 5. 
39  CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUD. IN CHILD WELFARE, CHILD WELL-BEING IN MINNESOTA: A 
PRIMER FOR THE 2013–2014 LEGISLATIVE SESSION 3 (2013) (stating that counties are 
responsible for the funding of child welfare services). Minnesota was one of forty-six states, 
in addition to the District of Columbia, to face such massive budget shortfalls in 2008. This 
led to the majority of states cutting services to families and vulnerable populations. NICHOLAS 
JOHNSON, PHIL OLIFF & ERICA WILLIAMS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, AN 
UPDATE ON STATE BUDGET CUTS 1 (2011).  
40 MEYER, supra note 37, at 5. The $3.8-million-dollar deficit for fiscal year 2009 caused the 
Board of Public Defense to stop offering services it was not required by law to provide. See 
also Elizabeth Stawicki, Public Defenders to Stop Representing Poor Parents in Child 
7
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transition to the county-by-county scheme of representation, the state 
consistently ranked among the lowest in the nation for state funding 
contribution and among the highest in county contribution.41 This funding 
scheme contributed to a system where Minnesota’s families can expect a 
system of justice by geography, as funding for representation is determined 
entirely by the county in which a family resides.  
After the Board reported that it would no longer represent parents, 
it was unclear, as a matter of law, who would thereafter be responsible for 
parent representation and its payment.42 Crow Wing County voted in July 
2008 not to pay for court-appointed counsel in such cases.43 In 2010, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court granted accelerated review to determine who 
would represent parents in child protection cases when the court deemed 
such appointment appropriate, and what entity would be responsible for 
payment.44  
The court did not consider the financial state of either the Board 
or the county when entering its decision, but instead analyzed the statutes 
concerning appointment of counsel in child protection proceedings.45 The 
court noted that nothing in the statutes dictating the appointment of counsel 
for parents in child protection cases required the appointment of a public 
defender.46 Although the court held that parents are not statutorily entitled 
to representation by a public defender, it is nevertheless permissible for a 
court to appoint private counsel in juvenile protection matters.47 The court 
also held that the legislature intended that, if the district court appoints 
parent’s counsel, it was for the county to pay each such expense.48 As a result 
of In re Welfare of J.B., individual counties are financially responsible for 
parents’ legal representation unless, and until, the legislature creates a 
statewide system for parent representation. 
In a separate proceeding, In re Welfare of S.L.J., the court came to 
the same conclusion when considering the appointment of public defenders 
for indigent Native American parents in child protection and termination of 
                                                           
Protection Cases, MPR NEWS (July 4, 2008), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2008/07/03/
public-defenders-to-stop-representing-poor-parents-in-child-protection-cases 
[https://perma.cc/7NCT-XFVY]. The Board continues to represent children in child 
protection cases, as children are appointed counsel by statute. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 
subdiv. 3(b) (“[I]f the child desires counsel but is unable to employ it, the court shall appoint 
counsel to represent the child who is ten years of age or older . . . at public expense.”) 
(emphasis added).  
41 CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUD. IN CHILD WELFARE, supra note 39, at 2. 
42 Stawicki, supra note 40. 
43 In re Welfare of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Minn. 2010). 
44 Id. at 538. 
45 Id. at 540–41. 
46 Id. at 542 (citing MINN. STAT. § 611.18). 
47 Id. at 544.  
48 Id.  
8
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parental rights cases.49 While Native American parents unable to afford 
representation are statutorily given court-appointed counsel in juvenile 
protection proceedings under the Indian Child Welfare Act,50 there is no 
statutory evidence that Congress intended such appointment to be filled by 
a public defender.51  
 As a result of both In re Welfare of J.B., and In re Welfare of 
S.L.J., the court confirmed that each of Minnesota’s eighty-seven counties 
had to find attorneys to represent parents, in addition to finding a way to 
fund such parent representation. Consequently, there are now eighty-seven 
different ways of recruiting, paying, supervising, and monitoring parent 
attorneys. One attorney writing anonymously to the ABA lamented that 
parent attorneys are generally left to struggle within the county-mandated 
and funded system.52 This individual reported that “[n]one of the 87 
counties provides pre-service or in-service training for their parent attorneys. 
The attorneys struggle to understand the overall purpose and process of the 
child protection court system, their role and responsibilities within that 
system, and the role of others.”53 This sentiment is supported by additional 
reports, which state that outcomes for children and families vary widely by 
county, and that the state is limited in its ability to influence county 
performance and outcomes.54  
Minnesota’s public defenders remain overwhelmed.55 The Board 
continues to identify child protection as the fastest growing area of 
proceedings in Minnesota, with the number of cases increasing by nearly 
fifty percent between 2015 and 2018.56 Based on both caseloads and current 
staffing, the Board states that it is only at 68.5% of attorney staffing as 
                                                           
49 782 N.W.2d 549, 554–55 (Minn. 2010). 
50 Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (2006). 
51 In re S.L.J., 782 N.W.2d at 554. 
52 AM. BAR ASS’N, CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM 
PARENT ATTORNEY SURVEY RESULTS 2 (2011). 
53 Id. This issue is not specific to Minnesota. Even in states where the appointment of counsel 
is mandatory, there is no guarantee that the appointed attorney will be familiar with the child 
protection system so as to provide adequate representation. Wendy Haight, Jane Marshall 
& Joanna Woolman, The Child Protection Clinic: A Mixed Method Evaluation of Parent 
Legal Representation, 56 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 7, 8 (2015).  
54 CTR. FOR ADVANCED STUD. IN CHILD WELFARE, supra note 39, at 3.  
55 As of 2016, public defenders have consistently been the most frequent users of the 
Minnesota state court system, with around 150,000 cases per year. Bob Collins, Governor 
Starves Public Defender Program, Gets Appointed to a Case, MPR NEWS (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://blogs.mprnews.org/newscut/2016/08/governor-starves-public-defender-program-gets-
appointed-to-a-case/ [https://perma.cc/8B77-ZVU3]. 
56 MINN. BD. OF PUB. DEF., 2020–21 BIENNIAL BUDGET 7 (2018). The Board attributes the 
increase in cases to both statutory changes and changes in enforcement. Id.   
9
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recommended by both state and national standards.57 The Board further 
predicts that if the current increase in child protection cases continues and 
no additional attorneys are provided, staffing will drop to sixty-three percent 
of state and national standards by fiscal year 2021.58 The Board additionally 
anticipates a doubling of child protection cases between 2015 and 2021 if 
there continues to be increased emphasis on child protection cases at both 
a state and national level.59 In summation, the number of child protection 
cases is likely to continue increasing in Minnesota and across the nation. 
With our already overwhelmed force of public defenders, simply mandating 
public defenders to resume representing parents—without altering the 
budget and resources available to the Board—is not a viable option for 
Minnesota.   
B.  Minnesota’s 2018 Analysis of Section 260C.163: In re the Welfare of 
the Child of A.M.C. 
While the Supreme Court previously determined that parents’ 
appointment of counsel would not be fulfilled by the Board and that 
representation would be at county expense, the court did not, in that same 
line of cases, consider the discretionary appointment of counsel at the 
district court level. The Minnesota Court of Appeals most recently analyzed 
section 260C.163 subdivision 3(c) in 2018, in In re the Welfare of the Child 
of A.M.C.60 As stated in Parts II and IV, the determination of whether to 
appoint counsel to parents in child protection cases is a discretionary 
decision resting with the district court. The court of In re the Welfare of the 
Child of A.M.C. considered the extent of the district court’s discretion in 
the appointment of counsel to a noncustodial father.61  
In the context of In re the Child of A.M.C., it is important to note 
that custodial and noncustodial parents generally have different rights under 
the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection and Procedure.62 Custodial 
                                                           
57 Id. Additionally, the Board is also operating with only fifty-seven percent of the support 
staff recommended by state and national standards with respect to child protection cases. Id. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. The Board concluded that the assumption of public defender costs by the state from 
the counties has become unsustainable. Id. 
60 In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
61 Id. at 652.  
62 See generally MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 32.01 (2019) (stating who receives party status); 
MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 32.02 (2019) (detailing the rights of parties); see also MINN. R. JUV. 
PROT. P. 33.01 (2019) (stating who is a participant in a proceeding); MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 
33.02 (2019) (detailing the rights of participants). Notably, appointment of counsel for both 
parties and participants is governed by Rule 36 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection 
and Procedure, which states that “[e]very party and participant has the right to be represented 
by counsel in every juvenile protection matter . . . .” MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 36.01 (2019). 
10
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parents have greater rights in child protection proceedings.63 Custodial 
parents are considered parties to a child protection proceeding, while 
noncustodial parents are only participants to the proceeding.64 The 
party/participant designation provides varying attendant rights. In In re 
Welfare of the Child of A.M.C., the district court determined in the child 
in need of protection or services (CHIPS) proceeding that, because the 
father was a noncustodial parent and therefore not a party to the 
proceedings, he was not entitled to court-appointed counsel.65  
The court of appeals first quickly dismissed the father’s contentions 
that his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause were 
violated when the district court declined to appoint him counsel.66 The court 
likewise quickly dismissed his contention that his due process rights were 
violated, as the Minnesota Supreme Court has never found there to be a 
due process right to counsel under the Minnesota Constitution.67 In 
reviewing section 260C.163 to determine if the district court erroneously 
denied the father appointment of counsel, the court of appeals noted the 
district court recognized the father as a legal parent in the previous 
proceeding.68 It noted that the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection and 
Procedure distinguishes participants and parties, but section 260C.163 of 
the Minnesota Statutes “does not distinguish between parents who are 
parties and parents who are participants.”69 
                                                           
However, such appointment is pursuant to section 260C.163, which is a discretionary 
standard. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subdiv. (3)(c) (2020).  
63 Participants only have four statutorily enumerated rights, including legal representation at 
the discretion of the court. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 33.02 (2019). Parties to the proceedings 
have all attendant party-rights. Id. 
64 Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 22.02, subdiv. 1.  
65 In re A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 660. The district court did, however, appoint father counsel 
during the termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding, and he had counsel on appeal. 
Id. at 658. 
66 Id. at 654 (stating that the equal protection argument was inadequately briefed for the court 
to review). 
67 Id. at 659. The court noted the constraints placed on the due-process rights to counsel 
imposed by Lassiter in the context of a termination of parental rights proceeding. Id. The 
court additionally stated that the Minnesota Supreme Court has never held that the 
Minnesota Constitution provides parents with a due process right to court appointed counsel. 
Id.  
68 Id. While the child’s father was never married to the child’s mother, they lived together as 
a family unit for ten years, and the father was adjudicated as such by Recognition of 
Parentage. Id. at 653. Note also that Rule 36 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection 
Procedure states that “[t]he appointment of counsel for a parent . . . shall occur as soon as 
practicable after the request is made.” MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 36.02 subdiv. 2 (2019). This 
seems to create tension between those adjudicated as parents and non-custodial parents. 
69  In re A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 660. 
11
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In interpreting section 260C.163, the court of appeals noted that 
the legislature did not define the word “appropriate.”70 The court 
additionally noted the legislature did not provide any factors for a district 
court to consider in the application of its discretion to appoint counsel in 
child protection proceedings.71  
Because section 260C.163 of the Minnesota Statutes provides a 
discretionary standard for the appointment of counsel, any appellate court 
is constrained in its review to determine if the district court abused its 
discretion by improperly applying the law.72 Appellate courts will therefore 
only find an abuse of discretion when the district court reached a decision 
against both the logic and facts on record.73 The court of appeals concluded 
that because the father of the child is an adjudicated father, and because 
section 260C.163 of the Minnesota Statutes does not require that a parent 
be a party before they are appointed counsel, the district court erred by 
declining to appoint the father counsel under section 260C.163.74  
However, although the court of appeals determined the district 
court had erred by not appointing counsel based on the father’s participant 
status, it determined the error was harmless.75 The court of appeals 
additionally concluded that because the father was not a meaningful option 
for placement of the child,76 it was unwilling to state the appointment of 
                                                           
70 Id. at 659–60 (citing the language of section 260C.163 subdivision 3(c) of the Minnesota 
Statutes, which reads: “the court shall appoint counsel to represent the parent, guardian, or 
custodian in any case in which it feels that such an appointment is appropriate . . . .”). I argue 
in Part IV of this note that Minnesota courts should be equally concerned with the presence 
of the word “feel,” in the statute, as it is with the word “appropriate.” See infra Part IV. To 
that end, the court of appeals in In re A.M.C. acknowledged that it found the Legislature’s 
use of “feel” in statutory language peculiar. See, e.g., In re A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 660 n.6 
(“The legislature’s use of the verb ‘to feel’ is unusual, but we take the statute as we find it.”). 
71 In re A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 660. 
72 Id. at 654 (citing In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2012)). 
73 Id. at 660 (citing Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984), which stated that 
“[t]here must be a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record 
before this court will find that the trial court abused its discretion.”). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. The court thoroughly reviewed the record and determined clear and convincing 
evidence supported the district court’s decision to terminate father’s parental rights. Id. at 
661–664. In so finding, the court gave three additional reasons for declining to reverse. Id. 
First, the court stated that the father did not appeal the order of the district court terminating 
his rights. Id. Second, the court inferred that the district court “implicitly ‘felt’” that 
appointment of counsel for the father was not appropriate in this case, as the father was 
repeatedly incarcerated and unavailable to care for the child. Id. at 660–61. Third, the court 
stated that it was not in the best interest of the child to delay a permanent placement with 
foster parents, with whom the child had been thriving. Id. at 661.  
76 Id. (“Father was incarcerated for significant periods of time and was repeatedly 
noncompliant with conditions of his probation.”). 
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counsel would have otherwise been “appropriate.”77 Although the court 
noted the ambiguity presented by section 260C.163—in that the statute fails 
to define the word “appropriate” or offer any factors for a district court to 
consider in exercising its discretion78—the court was unable to state that it 
would have felt any differently about the decision to decline to give the father 
counsel based upon the facts of this case.79  
C.  The Emergency Protective Care (EPC) Hearing 
The EPC hearing represents the first opportunity for a parent to be 
heard by a court, and for the parent to be represented by an attorney in a 
child protection proceeding. The EPC hearing—the first hearing in a child 
protection matter—determines significant rights of parents to their children 
during the pendency of the case and beyond. If a child has been taken into 
emergency protective care, an EPC hearing must be held within seventy-two 
hours of the child’s removal from the home.80 The purpose of an EPC 
hearing is “to determine whether the child shall be returned home or [be] 
placed in protective care.”81 This initial hearing, in determining placement 
and visitation rights, is the most critical in the child protection court 
process.82 The Supreme Court recognized in Stanley v. Illinois that “the 
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management 
of his or her children” was at stake in such proceedings.83 The Supreme 
Court has also determined that “until the State proves parental unfitness, 
the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous 
termination of their natural relationship.”84 If the child’s removal is ordered 
at an EPC hearing, reunification becomes more difficult for families, and 
courts may not recommend reunification until every aspect of a service plan 
is met.85 Additionally, studies indicate once a child has been removed from 
                                                           
77 Id. The court of appeals inferred from a “number of the district court’s statements” that 
this was implicit in the district court’s decision to not appoint counsel to the father, and that, 
on this record, a finding that appointment of counsel was not appropriate would not have 
been an abuse of discretion. Id.  
78 Id. at 659–60 
79 Id. at 661.  
80 MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 42.01 subdiv. 1 (2019) (stating an exception to this rule is if the 
child was released from emergency protective care pursuant to Rule 41 of the Minnesota 
Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure).  
81 Id. 
82 WILLIAM G. JONES, WORKING WITH THE COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION 26 (2006). The 
Honorable William G. Jones states that the EPC hearing is also important for setting the 
tone for future interactions between all involved parties in the proceeding. Id.  
83 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
84 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982). 
85 Frank E. Vandervort & Vivek S. Sankaran, Protocol for Attorneys Representing Parents in 
Child Protective Proceedings, U. OF MICH. L. SCH. SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 12 (2008). 
In Minnesota, the county bringing the petition must use appropriate services to “meet the 
13
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the home, decision-makers prefer to let past placement decisions stand, in 
what has been termed the “sequentially effect.”86 The stakes of an EPC 
hearing can therefore appear heightened in Termination of Parental Rights 
proceedings, which threatens to permanently sever the fundamental liberty 
interest parents have in the control and care of their children.87  
D.  The Appealability of Decisions Made During an EPC Hearing in 
Minnesota 
Further, while Lassiter establishes the due process framework for 
representation in civil matters, it is for individual states to determine whether 
due process requires representation in child protection proceedings.88 
However, EPC hearings are likely not appealable by right in Minnesota.89 
While the decision to appoint counsel may be appealable, 90 any decision 
made at an EPC hearing is not appealable by right until a final order has 
                                                           
needs of the child’s family . . . to eliminate the need for removal and reunite the family.” 
MINN. STAT. § 260.012(f) (2020). Additionally, service plans—of which a parent must meet 
every aspect—may place significant burdens on families, with “plans that look more like 
grocery lists than thoughtful targeted approaches to reunification.” Cristina Freitas, Debbie 
Freitas, Michael Heard & Alexandra Roark, Bringing Data to Life, ABA, (Feb. 27, 2020) 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_practic
eonline/january---december-2020/bringing-data-to-life--data-as-a-tool-for-parent-
representation/ [https://perma.cc/3TYV-7N8V]. The average parent must complete 7.5 
services, and task completion “requires an average of 22 to 26 hours per week.” Id.  
86 See Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, 
Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 139–55 (1995). 
87 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 
HIGH QUALITY LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ALL PARTIES IN CHILD WELFARE 
PROCEEDINGS REPORT 3 (2017). The Department of Human Services noted that the 
termination of parental rights is “often referred to as the civil law equivalent of the death 
penalty.” Id. 
88  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.’s of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 34–35 (1981) (“I am 
content to join the narrow holding of the Court, leaving the appointment of counsel in 
termination  proceedings to be determined by the state courts on a case-by-case basis.”) 
(Burger, J., concurring). 
89 See In re Welfare of E.G., 876 N.W.2d 872, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that there 
is no appeal as of right from a CHIPS intermediate disposition order). Under an extension 
of the logic of E.G., any attempt to directly appeal an EPC determination would likely be 
dismissed. The Court declined to consider the issue in 2017. In re S.M.H., No. A17-0841, 
2017 WL 5077441, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2017) (“[A]ppellant made no effort to 
appeal from the initial transfer of custody after the EPC hearing. Whether that initial custody 
transfer would be reviewable by discretionary review, extraordinary writ, or otherwise is not 
before us.”). However, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure allow for the 
“discretionary review” of cases not otherwise appealable, “in the interests of justice.” MINN. 
R. CIV. APP. P. 105.01 (2020).  
90 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32 (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981)).  
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been issued in the case.91 Any initial errors in a district court’s individualized, 
explicit findings determining whether a child is in need of protection or 
services, or in its determination of assigning placement of the child—
including continuing out-of-home placement of the child or stranger foster 
care—are allowed to compound until the resolution of the case.92  
Erroneous removals can imbue children with lasting trauma.93 The 
effect of removal on children and families is one that “cannot be undone.”94 
The Supreme Court has never held that harms may be committed if they 
are allowed to be undone, and the Court has recognized that, during the 
delay between an error and the court and its undoing, parents suffer from 
the deprivation of their children.95 The Court also recognized the harm to 
those children resulting from “uncertainty and dislocation.”96 Yet, mistakes 
in Minnesota are allowed to compound when parents are not represented, 
                                                           
91 A final order is typically understood as an order that “ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” See, e.g., Catlin v. United States, 
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). Courts in child protection cases must constantly analyze and 
decide the legal rights afforded to families, all of which impact the children of the state. 
However, these decisions are made as part of an ongoing case, rendering these decisions 
interlocutory and generally unappealable. See MINN. STAT. § 558.215 (2020). 
92 While an interlocutory order may be heard by the court of appeals or the supreme court 
by bringing it by extraordinary writ, this still does not obviate the issue that the determinations 
made at an EPC hearing—which can be made regarding an unrepresented parent—are not 
appealable by right. See MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 120 (outlining the procedure by which to 
bring a case by extraordinary writ).  
93 Children who experience placement in foster care further have been found to suffer from 
greater instances of mental health disorders, lower rates of employment, and higher rates of 
homelessness, as compared to those who never experienced the foster care system. Theo 
Liebmann, What’s Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for Comprehensive, 
Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 141, 143 (2006); see 
also Katherine Kortenkamp & Jennifer Ehrle Macomber, The Well-Being of Children 
Involved with the Child Welfare System: A National Overview, THE URBAN INST. 2 (2002) 
(“Children in the child welfare system are more likely to have behavioral and emotional 
problems compared with all children in parent care and even compared with children living 
in high-risk parent care.”). Even removals for short periods of time can cause lasting harm, 
and research indicates that even short separations can create future barriers to success. See 
Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Adult Crime: Using Investigator Assessment to 
Estimate Causal Effects of Foster Care, 116 J. POL. ECON. 746, 756–58 (2008). While it is 
sometimes necessary to place children in out-of-home care, family settings can help obviate 
some trauma resulting from removal. MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., MINNESOTA’S OUT-
OF-HOME CARE AND PERMANENCY REPORT, 2017 9 (2018).  
94 Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility Reviews and Child and 
Family Services State Plan Reviews, 65 FED. REG. 4020, 4052 (Jan. 25, 2000) (codified as 45 
C.F.R. § 1355 (2021), 45 C.F.R. § 1356 (2021), 45 C.F.R. § 1357 (2021)). 
95 See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972). 
96 Id.  
15
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and hearings determining placement are not appealable until the conclusion 
of all proceedings.97 
In this Minnesota is not alone; twenty-one states do not have clear 
laws on the appellate process for dependency review hearings, and at least 
ten more states have decided that such hearings are not subject to appellate 
review.98 However, Minnesota is one of only twelve states that do not 
statutorily mandate appointment of counsel for parents after initiating a 
child protection proceeding.99 Minnesota is, therefore, in the minority of 
states that do not mandate appointment of counsel to parents in child 
protection proceedings. Additionally, only five other states allow for 
discretionary appointment of counsel in child protection cases.100 As 
Minnesota does not mandate counsel for parents and likely does not permit 
appeals of decisions made at an EPC hearing, errors that could have been 
prevented by mandating counsel before an EPC hearing are allowed to 
persist until the conclusion of trial and beyond.101 
                                                           
97 Other advocates have called for states to reform appellate review procedures in interim 
dependency decisions, in the interest of justice. Alicia LeVezu, The Illusion of Appellate 
Review in Dependency Proceedings, 68 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 83, 84 (2017). 
98 Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect Cases Between 
Disposition and Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 13, 29–32 (2010). 
99 See VIVEK SANKARAN & JOHN POLLOCK, U. MICH. L. SCH. CHILD ADVOC. L. CLINIC, A 
NATIONAL SURVEY ON A PARENT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN STATE-INITIATED DEPENDENCY 
AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES 1 (2016).  
100 See id. at 2–25. States allowing for judicial discretion in the appointment of counsel in 
child welfare proceedings are Delaware, Missouri, Hawaii, Indiana, and Wisconsin. Id. 
California also allows discretion in the appointment of counsel, but only if the child is not in 
out-of-home placement. Id. 
101 Statutes controlling the timelines in child protection cases are in place to ensure that courts 
“provide a just, thorough, speedy, and efficient determination of each juvenile protection 
matter . . . .” MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 1.02(b) (2019). However, if the child has been removed 
and the parent is properly working on a case plan, the matter may be continued for an 
additional six months, thus marking one year from removal. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.212 
subdiv. 1a(b) (2020). The Adoption and Safe Families Act (P.L. 105-89) requires a 
permanency planning hearing at twelve months from the date the child entered care, and 
every twelve months thereafter to review and approve the permanency plan for the child. 
Child Welfare Information Gateway, Court Hearings for the Permanent Placement of 
Children, CHILDREN’S BUREAU 2 (2016) (citing Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115). Further, if the parent intends to appeal the court’s final 
order, the timeline for appeal is strict, which could make compliance by an unrepresented 
parent especially difficult. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 23.02 subdiv. 2 (2019) (“An appeal shall 
be taken within 20 days of the service of notice”). Finally, others have argued that when 
permanency decisions cannot be reviewed until the conclusion of the case, appellate judges 
are incentivized to avoid looking too closely at the trial courts determination of reasonable 
efforts made by the agency. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 98, at 27. 
16
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IV.  260C.163: THE WORD “FEEL” PROVIDES UNBRIDLED 
DISCRETION TO DETERMINE IF LITIGANTS ARE ASSIGNED COUNSEL 
It is well known that there are great and long-standing inequalities 
in the American justice system between the wealthy and the poor.102 As 
discussed in Part II, the United States ranks in the bottom third of countries 
in providing access to justice as of 2019.103 Reginald Heber Smith—whose 
work is generally cited as revolutionary in the legal aid movement104—
observed that “substantive law, however fair and equitable itself, is impotent 
to provide the necessary safeguards unless the administration of justice, 
which alone gives effect and force to substantive law, is in the highest sense 
impartial.”105 The legal system of the United States is founded on the idea 
that the judiciary is impartial in interpreting and applying the law.106 Further, 
the International Declaration of Human Rights states that “[e]veryone is 
entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal . . . .”107  
The language of section 260C.163 of the Minnesota Statutes does 
not provide appropriate guidelines for judges to determine whether parents 
                                                           
102 REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL OF 
JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION 
BEFORE THE LAW 8 (1919) (“[T]he rich and the poor do not stand equally before the law; 
the traditional method of providing justice has operated to close the doors of the courts to 
the poor, and has caused a gross denial of justice in all parts of the country to millions of 
persons.”). 
103 NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., supra note 27 (ranking the United States 65th 
of 99 countries when measuring “providing access to justice.”). After Lassiter, the United 
States affirmed its stance apart from the European Court of Human Rights decision in Airey 
v. Ireland, which stated that free counsel is a human right. Following this decision, the 
Council of Europe required its now forty-seven members member countries to provide free 
civil counsel. NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., International Perspective on Right 
to Counsel in Civil Cases, http://civilrighttocounsel.org/about/international_perspective 
[https://perma.cc/69M6-E47C]. see also Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Cr. H.R. (1979). 
104 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: Access to Justice in the United States, 
7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 5–6 (2001) (describing Reginald Heber Smith’s 
“groundbreaking” work “galvanized a national movement to provide lawyers for those who 
could not afford to pay counsel fees.”). 
105 SMITH, supra note 102, at 5. 
106 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (“The United States legal 
system is based upon the principle that an independent, impartial, and competent judiciary 
. . . will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.”); Justice in Jeopardy, 2003 
A.B.A. REP. OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 9 (stating that impartial 
judges are necessary for the rule of law and that the law would be reduced to judicial whim 
without impartial judges).  
107 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10 1948) 
(UDHR), (while the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights binds the United 
States to the UDHR, any obligations flowing from the UDHR are not enforceable in the 
United States, as the rights are not self-executing); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
734–35 (2004).  
17
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should receive counsel in child protection cases. Section 260C.163 states 
that, “if the parent, guardian, or custodian desires counsel but is unable to 
employ it, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the parent, guardian, 
or custodian in any case in which it feels that such an appointment is 
appropriate.”108 While the language of the statute seems to indicate a strict 
standard of appointment in its use of the phrase “shall appoint,” the statute 
concludes that appointment of counsel is permissive.109 Not only is the 
statute permissive, it provides no guidelines to assist the district court in 
determining if counsel should be appointed. The statute merely directs the 
district court to appoint counsel when it “feels” it to be appropriate.110 Such 
a statute is unhelpful in that it provides no guidance for the district court and 
therefore seemingly calls for unguided judicial discretion. 
Merriam Webster defines “feel” as “to have a marked sentiment or 
opinion.”111 Black’s Law Dictionary provides no definition of “feel,” but 
does provide a definition of the word “arbitrary,” which reads: “[d]epending 
on individual discretion; of, relating to, or involving a determination made 
without consideration of or regard for facts, circumstances, fixed rules, or 
procedures.”112 Section 260C.263 provides no fixed rules or procedures for 
a district court to consider when determining whether to appoint counsel to 
parents. Although a district court judge is able to act with discretion, they 
are “not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure.”113 
While there is no cause to believe that any district court would 
intentionally use the language of the statute to act in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner, section 260C.163 subdivision (3)(c) provides no 
guidance for its application. We assume “public officials are properly 
performing their duties,”114 and “government official[s] properly perform[] 
[their] official duties and compl[y] with statutory procedures.”115 Indeed, any 
party in litigation asserting public officers did not act within the limits of their 
                                                           
108 MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subdiv. 3(c) (excepting cases where the petition is solely based 
on habitual truancy) (emphasis added). 
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Feel, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/feel [https://perma.cc/ELV6-K5RX]. Of note, the court of appeals 
stated that it “underst[oo]d [feel] to have the meaning: ‘To be persuaded of’ or ‘To believe; 
think.’” In re Welfare of the Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 660 n.6 (Minn. 2018) (citing 
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 647 (5th ed. 2011)). 
112 Arbitrary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see SANKARAN & POLLOCK, supra 
note 99 (further stating that Minnesota is the only state in the country to use the word “feel” 
in connection with the appointment of counsel in child protection proceedings). 
113 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921). 
114 Otter Tail Power Co. v. Vill. of Elbow Lake, 49 N.W.2d 197, 205 (Minn. 1951). 
115 R.E. Short Co. v. Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn. 1978). 
18
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss2/2
2021] MINNESOTA’S CHILD PROTECTION STYSTEM 465 
statutory powers has the burden of overcoming the presumption of proper 
performance.116  
There is, correctly, the presumption that public officials properly 
perform their duties. However, the direction of section 260C.163 to appoint 
counsel in situations where the district court “feels” it to be appropriate does 
not provide language adequate to ensure the judiciary is acting as a neutral 
intermediary between the reach of the state and the lives of its constituents, 
concerning the control and custody of their children. While not 
immediately applicable, the Supreme Court has invalidated statutes for lack 
of narrow tailoring when there are “no standards prescribed for the exercise 
of [ ] discretion.”117 
It has long been held that judges are to give effect to the law, and 
not to personal feelings.118 As the Supreme Court elaborated in Osborn v. 
President, Directors & Co. of Bank, “[j]udicial power is never exercised for 
the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose 
of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of 
the law.”119 Discretion, when utilized by a court, must mean discretion with 
sound footing in the law; it must not be arbitrary and capricious, giving effect 
to the personal feelings of any one judge.120 The will of the judiciary does 
not exist; courts, as “mere instruments of the law,”121 exercise discretion in 
“discerning the course prescribed by law; and . . . it is the duty of the court 
                                                           
116 Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. Ramsey, 609 N.W.2d 868, 876 (Minn. 2000) (stating that 
evidence is “viewed in the context of a presumption that the county assessor, as a government 
official, properly performed his official duties and complied with statutory procedures” in 
certifying minimum market value of property). 
117 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560 (1948) (holding that a city ordinance limiting speech 
in public places except with permission of the police and offering no standards for the 
exercise of such police discretion is unconstitutional on its face). Saia was discussing freedom 
of speech under the First Amendment and the requirement that if statutes are to limit that 
right they must be narrowly tailored. See also Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 71 
(1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). “The ordinance is 
unconstitutional, not because a policeman applied this discretion wisely or poorly in a 
particular case, but rather because the policeman enjoys too much discretion in every case. 
And if every application of the ordinance represents an exercise of unlimited discretion, then 
the ordinance is invalid . . . .” Id. 
118 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING 
JUDGES 32 (2008) (“Good judges pride themselves on the rationality of their rulings and the 
suppression of their personal proclivities, including most especially their emotions.”); contra 
William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 10 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 3 (1988) (stating that sensitivity to one’s intuition and passionate responses is both 
inevitable and desirable in the judicial process). 
119 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824). 
120 Rex v. Wilkes (1770, K. B.) 4 Burr. 2527, 2539 (“Discretion, when applied to a court of 
justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule not by humour; 
it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular.”). 
121 Osborn, 22 U.S. at 866. 
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to follow it.”122 Courts have long noted that discretion cannot be exercised 
by considering what would be fair, and that there must be settled rules 
guiding how discretion is to be exercised.123  
Finally, judicial oaths require judges to put any feelings toward 
litigants aside.124 If parents cannot afford counsel, section 260C.163 of the 
Minnesota Statutes directs judges to appoint counsel when the judge feels 
that appointment is appropriate.125 The judge is directed by statute to 
consider the interests of the parties involved in the litigation, which is 
proscribed both by judicial oaths and precedent.126  
This is not to argue that judges must be emotionless.127 It is noted 
that the work of judging is naturally emotionally charged.128 In matters 
dealing with children, it is possible that an emotional charge may be even 
more deeply felt. However, judges still may not let their feelings towards 
individual litigants affect the outcome of cases.129 Minnesota’s statute, at 
minimum, may allow for the appearance of individual judges’ feelings 
affecting their determination of whether parties in a child protection 
proceeding are appointed counsel, as the court is instructed by statute to be 
guided by “feel[ings].”130 Deference to the courts is uniquely dependent on 
the appearance of and actual integrity and impartiality of judges.131 To direct 
judges to appoint counsel according to their feelings regarding individual 
                                                           
122 Id.  
123 Haywood v. Cope, 25 Beav. 140, 140 (1858). 
124 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (stating “I, ____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
administer justice without respect to persons . . . .”). 
125 See MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subdiv. 3(c) (2020). 
126 See Sadberry v. Wilson 441 P.2d 381, 384 (Okla. 1968) (“Every litigant is entitled to 
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge who must possess the 
disinterestedness of a total stranger to the interests of the parties involved in the litigation . . 
. .”); Ranger v. Great W. Ry. Co., 10 Eng. Rep. 824, 831 (1854) (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(“[A] judge ought to be, and is supposed to be, indifferent between the parties.”). 
127 This would deny the long-standing and “unremarkable” conclusion that judges are human 
beings. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
493, 509 (2013). Further, one cannot simply extract their emotions upon appointment to the 
judiciary, and emotion is “fundamental” to “human existence.” See Andrew J. Wistrich, 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or 
Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 855, 855 (2015). 
128 See, e.g., Jennifer Scarduzio, Managing Order Through Deviance: The Emotional 
Deviance, Power, and Professional Work of Municipal Court Judges, 25 MGMT. COMM. Q. 
283, 287 (2011) (“There are several feeling rules for the judges’ expression of emotion when 
communicating and interacting with defendants and lawyers during the legal process . . . .”). 
129  See Denny Chin, Essay, Sentencing: A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1563–
64 (2012) (discussing how judges have stated that “[e]mpathy, of course, should play no role 
in a judge’s determination of what the law is . . . . We do not determine the law or decide 
cases based on ‘feelings’ or emotions or whether we empathize with one side or the other.”).  
130 See MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subdiv. 3(c) (2020).   
131 United States Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policy, Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges 3 (2019). 
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cases and litigants leaves room for questioning the impartiality and 
legitimacy of judicial authority.132  
Nonetheless, it is in the best interest of public policy to remove the 
language in section 260C.163, which seemingly provides free reign for the 
judiciary to determine whether parents receive counsel in matters 
concerning the custody of their children. “[C]ourts, be they high or low, 
should and must be like Caesar’s wife, above suspicion. Any other standard 
is one which undermines the trust and confidence of the average citizen in 
his government.”133 Courts have also recognized the value of appearances: 
not only do litigants have the right to trial by a judge who is impartial and 
disinterested, the appearance of such trial must be fair.134 Bearing in mind 
long and enduring inequities between the wealthy and the poor with respect 
to access to the legal system, it is perhaps easier for the public to retain faith 
in our judiciary if the public trusts they would have access to legal counsel 
on more occasions than just when the judiciary “feels” like appointing 
representation.135 This public perception may be particularly important 
considering that, although judges in Minnesota face re-election, they are 
initially appointed by the state’s executive branch. When children are 
removed from the home, they are removed by the state. The common 
denominator of “the state” may decrease trust in and erode the legitimacy 
of the state judiciary. Thus, it is sound public policy for judges to be given 
greater direction from the legislature than only to consider how they “feel” 
when appointing counsel in subsequent adversarial proceedings against the 
state.136 
                                                           
132 Judges appearing partial towards parties undermines judicial commitment to the rule of 
law, and the legitimacy of the judiciary suffers. Geyh, supra note 127, at 511. 
133 In re Turney, 533 A.2d 916, 920 (Md. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). 
134 See Jefferson-El v. State, 622 A.2d 737, 741 (Md. 1993) (recognizing “the importance of 
the judicial process not only being fair, but appearing to be fair.”) (emphasis added); see 
Stuart Chinn, The Meaning of Judicial Impartiality: An Examination of Supreme Court 
Confirmation Debates and Supreme Court Rulings on Racial Equality, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 
914, 918–919 (2020) (arguing that judicial impartiality aspires to the ideal of fairness. “[A]n 
impartial judge is a person who acts in a fair manner toward all parties in a case appearing 
before them.”). 
135 Charles Gardner Geyh argues that there are three subsets of people benefiting from judicial 
impartiality: 
(1) parties to ligation, who seek a fair hearing from an impartial judge, 
in a “procedural dimension” of impartiality; (2) the public, for whom 
the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary depends on the impartiality 
of its judges, in a “political dimension” of impartiality; and (3) judges 
themselves, who take an oath to be impartial and for whom impartiality 
is a standard of conduct that is core to their self-definition, in an “ethical 
dimension” of impartiality. 
Geyh, supra note 127, at 497. 
136 Additionally, section 260C.163 of the Minnesota Statutes is problematic because it creates 
no consistency for how judicial discretion of appointment is bound. For the standard “abuse 
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Attorneys who represent parents in child protection proceedings 
play a crucial role in safeguarding the liberty interests of both parents and 
children.137 Parents’ attorneys work to prevent unnecessary state intrusion in 
the arena of family life.138 However, attorneys are unable to protect the 
fundamental liberty interests of parents or children if they are not appointed 
in the first instance, as a result of Minnesota’s statute directing the judiciary 
to appoint counsel on the basis of an individual judge’s feelings. Section 
260C.163 of the Minnesota Statutes calling for the discretionary 
appointment of counsel for parents at the initial EPC hearing must be 
rewritten to better serve Minnesota’s families; parents should be provided 
access to information regarding their right to counsel, and parents should 
be appointed counsel in advance of their first court appearance at an EPC 
hearing.  
V.  MOVING BEYOND LASSITER AND SECTION 260C.163: IT IS IN 
THE BEST INTEREST OF MINNESOTA’S FAMILIES TO HAVE MANDATED 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
In 2008, the Children’s Justice Initiative recommended the 
Minnesota state legislature amend section 260C.163 subdivision 3 of the 
Minnesota Statutes to mandate the appointment of counsel to parents 
involved in child protection matters.139 However, no such changes 
mandating counsel occurred. Additionally, that same year, public defenders 
                                                           
of discretion” to be meaningful, there must be consistency in how that discretion is bound 
so abuse of such discretion can be readily recognized. See Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging 
Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 
994 (2010). 
137 At the EPC hearing, parents’ attorneys can advocate for the child’s placement with either 
the parent or parents, or in family out-of-home placement in situations where it is safe to 
advocate for such placement. Parents’ attorneys can also advocate for case plans that are 
appropriate for the family’s needs and which recommend services with the goal of 
reunification in mind.  
138  See Frank E. Vandervort & Vivek S. Sankaran, Child Welfare Services Div., Protocol For 
Attorneys Representing Parents In Child Protective Proceedings 2 (2008), 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1059&context=other 
[https://perma.cc/6P27-BC9B] (stating that, in preventing state overreach, parents’ attorneys 
function in a similar manner to defense lawyers in criminal cases).  
139 MEYER, supra note 37, at 17. The workgroup also recommended that section 260C.163 
be amended to read that indigent parents or indigent legal guardians who are parties to 
CHIPS, TPR, and other permanency cases have a mandatory right to court-appointed 
attorneys, and that indigent parents in TPR cases should also have such right. Id. 
Additionally, it should be remembered that the same year the workgroup’s report was 
published, Minnesota slashed the budget of the Board of Public Defense as the result of 
nation-wide state deficits, and the Board of Public Defense officially stated they would no 
longer represent parents in child welfare proceedings. Id.  
22
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss2/2
2021] MINNESOTA’S CHILD PROTECTION STYSTEM 469 
stopped representing parents in child protection matters due to statewide 
budget cuts.140  
In 2013, approximately 25,000 children across the country were 
removed from their homes and returned within thirty days.141 Minnesota—
after removing the mandatory right to counsel in 2008 and switching to the 
county-by-county system of representation—has one of the highest “short 
stayer” populations in the United States.142 As such, the state returned nearly 
twenty-eight percent of children within thirty days of removal from the 
home.143 Often, these children are returned to the same caretaker from 
whom they were removed.144 The median stay was six days outside the home 
for all short stayers, and only eighteen percent of all short stayers were 
placed in relative foster care placement.145 Authors Church and Sankaran 
noted that, while removal from the home causes trauma in children, such 
trauma can be “compounded when they are placed in unfamiliar settings.”146 
Out-of-home placement has been linked to difficulties in school, as well as 
emotional and behavioral problems.147 Removal often occurs at a very young 
age, when disrupting a child’s attachment to their primary caregiver can have 
negative consequences for future attachments.148 While the trauma and 
subsequent consequences experienced by removing children are well-
documented, it should be noted that sometimes placement in an out-of-
                                                           
140 Id. at 5. 
141 Christopher Church & Vivek Sankaran, Easy Come Easy Go: The Plight of Children Who 
Spend Less Than 30 Days in Foster Care, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 207, 217 (2016). 
142 See id. at 219–20 (defining a “short stayer” as a child removed from the home for less than 
thirty days). 
143 Id.  
144 See id. at 222 (finding that, nationally, 76.2% of children removed from their homes return 
to their original caretakers). Overall, most children in Minnesota are eventually returned to 
their original caretakers. In looking at all placements in Minnesota ending in 2017—not only 
placement episodes ending in less than thirty days—64.1% of children were returned to the 
same parent or caregiver from whom they were removed. MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., 
supra note 93, at 29. In Minnesota, the rate of reunification with the child’s primary 
caretakers has remained relatively consistent. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, 
MINNESOTA’S CHILDREN 2017 1 (2017) (reporting that sixty-four percent of children in 
Minnesota were returned to their original caretakers in 2014).  
145 Church & Sankaran, supra note 141, at 218.  
146 Id. at 226; see also UPENN COLLABORATIVE ON CMTY. INTEGRATION, REMOVAL FROM 
THE HOME: RESULTING TRAUMA 2, (“Removal from the home and replacement in the home 
can lead to feelings of instability, loss of status and a loss of control as children may always 
expect and fear that they can be removed and replaced at any time without explanation.”). 
As stated in Part II, removal from the home for even a short period of time can have long-
lasting emotional impact on a child. Liebmann, supra note 93, at 161–62. 
147 MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., supra note 93, at 9.  
148 Id. Additionally, children under the age of two, and children between the ages of fifteen 
and seventeen, are the most likely to experience out-of-home placement. Id. at 6. Studies 
have suggested that removing children before they are “pre-verbal” can exacerbate the trauma 
of removal. UPENN COLLABORATIVE ON CMTY. INTEGRATION, supra note 146, at 3.  
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home setting is necessary.149 Anecdotally, we are more aware of the 
sometimes devastating consequences of not removing children from homes 
from which they should be removed.150 However, removing a child from his 
or her home causes certain harm.151 Any unnecessary removals of children 
who subsequently become short stayers could potentially be obviated by 
appointment of counsel at or before the parents’ first appearance at the EPC 
hearing. As the purpose of the EPC hearing is to determine placement, 
parents’ attorneys are able to advocate for the child’s placement with parents 
or suitable relatives in instances where such placement is safe, thus 
mitigating potential trauma to the child.  
In addition to having one of the highest short stayer populations in 
the country, Minnesota has one of the highest removal rates in the country, 
removing children at a rate behind only five other states in the nation.152 In 
                                                           
149 However, family foster care settings have been found to help provide children placed out 
of their home with the support necessary for healthy development. MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. 
SERVS., supra note 93, at 9 (citing THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., RECONNECTING CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT AND CHILD WELFARE: EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES ON RESIDENTIAL 
PLACEMENT 7–8 (2012)); Minnesota reports that, in recent years, only thirty percent of 
children placed outside the home were placed with relatives. THE ANNIE E. CASEY 
FOUNDATION, Children in Foster Care by Placement Type in the United States (Oct. 22, 
2019), http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/6247-children-in-foster-care-by-
placementtype#detailed/2/2-52/true/36/2621/12994 [https://perma.cc/76NU-36JX]. In 
Minnesota, the numbers of children placed in non-relative out-of-home care has steadily 
increased since 2011. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, FY 2005–FY 2014 FOSTER CARE: ENTRIES, 
EXITS, AND IN CARE ON THE LAST DAY OF EACH FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR (2015); CHILD 
WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, supra note 144 (reporting that an additional 2,525 children 
were living in non-relative out-of-home placements in 2015 than in 2011). Most children 
experiencing placement in out-of-home stranger placements were five years of age or 
younger. Id. Perhaps such low numbers of relative placement are largely accounted for by 
family members who are unable to care for relative children in contact with the child 
protection system. See id. It is also possible that significantly fewer children find their way to 
placement with their relatives as the result of the lack of parent attorneys at EPC hearings, 
who would have been able to advocate for such suitable relative placement. See id.   
150 For example, the horrific death of Eric Dean following fifteen reports of abuse is known 
in Minnesota as it led to massive child protection reforms across the state. MINN. DEP’T OF 
ADMIN. COUNCIL ON DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, 2014: Death of Boy with Disabilities 
Sparks New Legislation, https://mn.gov/mnddc/future/2014/2014-06.html 
[https://perma.cc/DS23-39KX]; see also Jay Olstad & Steve Eckert, Pope County Abuse 
Case Exposes Problems with System, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2014)  
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2014/09/29/eric-dean-pope-county-15-
reports/16425467/e [https://perma.cc/5BJH-X2WK] (“‘The picture of 4-year-old Eric 
Dean,’ said governor Mark Dayton, ‘will haunt me for a long[]time.’”). 
151 Joanna Woolman & Jeff Hayden, The Trauma of Child Separation Also Exists Right Here 
in Minnesota, STAR TRIBUNE (July 13, 2018), http://www.startribune.com/the-trauma-of-
child-separation-also-exists-right-here-in-minnesota/488151491/ [https://perma.cc/836C-
UBNK] (stating that leaving children in homes where they are in danger can lead to 
“catastrophic consequences” but also that removal inevitably causes trauma from separation).  
152 Id.  
24
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss2/2
2021] MINNESOTA’S CHILD PROTECTION STYSTEM 471 
2017, 16,593 children in Minnesota experienced some form of out-of-home 
placement for at least one day.153 Some counties in Minnesota have reported 
increases of more than 100% in removals over the last few years.154 2017 
marked an overall increase in removals by 10.6% from 2016.155 Over one-
third of children removed were returned to their original caretaker in six 
months or less.156 It is worth noting that a little over one-fifth of the children 
removed in Minnesota are removed under the broad category of neglect.157 
The blurring of the line between neglect and the mere effects of 
poverty is apparent in section 260C.007 of the Minnesota Statutes.158 This 
statute permits a child to be adjudicated as a child in need of protection or 
services due to a lack of adequate care when the child “is without necessary 
food, clothing, shelter, education or other required care . . . because the 
child’s parent, guardian, or custodian is unable . . . to provide that care[.]”159 
Maren K. Dale, writing for the ABA, notes that poverty can lead to 
increased rates of actual maltreatment.160 However, issues arise when poverty 
is mistaken for neglect, which leads to the increased reporting of low-income 
families to child protection services.161  
In addition to families who experience poverty, families of color are 
also overrepresented in Minnesota’s child protection system.162 In 
                                                           
153 MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., supra note 93, at 6.  
154 Woolman & Hayden, supra note 151.  
155 MINN. DEP’T OF HUM SERVS., supra note 93, at 6. 
156 Id. at 7. 
157 Id. at 21. Notably, parental drug abuse accounts for almost one-third of removals. Id. This 
could account for the topic of another paper entirely.  
158 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 6(3) (2020).  
159 Id.  
160 Maren K. Dale, Addressing the Underlying Issue of Poverty in Child-Neglect Cases, AM. 
BAR ASS’N (Apr. 10, 2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-
rights/articles/2014/addressing-underlying-issue-poverty-child-neglect-cases/ 
[https://perma.cc/WLT8-V2HH] (“The inability to feed, clothe, or house a child should not 
be mistaken for neglect.”). 
161 One 2017 study in Wisconsin found a strong correlation between housing instability, 
welfare benefits, and risk of Child Protection Services involvement. Kristen S. Slack, Sarah 
Font, Kathryn Maguire-Jack & Lawrence M. Berger, Predicting Child Protective Services 
(CPS) Involvement among Low-Income U.S. Families with Young Children Receiving 
Nutritional Assistance, 14 INT. J. ENV’T. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1197 (2017). Additionally, 
New York’s Center for Family Representation (CFR) notes that all the families it serves live 
below the poverty line, and thirty-one percent struggle with issues of homelessness or 
unstable housing. Our Families, CTR. FOR FAM. REPRESENTATION, 
https://www.cfrny.org/our-families/ [https://perma.cc/UW3N-XBWR].  
162 This issue is not isolated to Minnesota. Families identifying as a member of minority 
populations are overrepresented in child welfare systems across the nation. U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. CHILD. BUREAU, RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND 
DISPARITY IN CHILD WELFARE 2 (2016). The CFR states that eighty-eight percent of its 
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Minnesota, African American and Native American families are 
significantly more likely to encounter the state’s child protection system than 
their Caucasian-family counterparts.163 Based on relative population 
percentages, Native American families will encounter the child protection 
system at a rate 18.5 times greater than their Caucasian counterparts.164 
Similarly, African American families are three times more likely to 
experience the child protection system than their Caucasian counterparts 
with respect to relative population size.165 Finally, children identifying as “two 
or more races” experienced care at a rate 4.8 times greater than their 
Caucasian counterparts.166 
In summary, these statistics indicate that Minnesota’s poor are most 
likely to encounter the child protection system. Minnesota’s communities 
of color are also more likely to encounter the child protection system when 
compared to Caucasian families in the state. Additionally, the state’s 
communities of color face a far greater risk of their children being placed in 
out-of-home placement than their Caucasian counterparts. Families both 
below the poverty line and identifying with minority heritage have a 
significantly greater chance of encountering Minnesota’s child protection 
system than any other population subset within the state. It follows that, 
because Minnesota does not automatically assign counsel in child protection 
proceedings, Minnesota disproportionately does not provide representation 
to the state’s poor and populations of color in child protection proceedings. 
It is this author’s conclusion that, because Minnesota does not automatically 
assign counsel before the initial EPC hearing, Minnesota is more likely to 
remove children from the home of families of its poor and minority 
residents.  
Attorney representation consistently leads to more positive 
outcomes for families.167 In Minnesota, attorney representation in child 
protection proceedings could consistently lead to more positive outcomes 
for the state’s poor families and families of color. In the first hearing, the 
advocate is able to contest removals, identify relatives to act as placement 
options if the child cannot return to the care of their parents, and identify 
                                                           
clients are people of color. CTR. FOR FAM. REPRESENTATION, supra note 161. The CFR also 
reports that twenty-six percent of its clients are immigrants. Id.  
163 While Caucasian children comprise the largest number of children in the care of the state, 
the disproportionality by race which factors into the likelihood that families will experience 
care, or encounter the child protection system, is of “significant concern.” MINN. DEP’T OF 
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 93, at 6. 
164 Id. at 16.  
165 Id.  
166 Id. 
167 Elizabeth Thornton & Betsy Gwin, High-Quality Legal Representation for Parents in Child 
Welfare Cases Results in Improved Outcomes for Families and Potential Cost Savings, 46 
FAM. L.Q. 139, 139 (2012). 
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appropriate safety planning options and resources.168 Overall, represented 
parents attend court more often, stipulate to fewer allegations, and have their 
children placed in a non-foster care arrangement more often than their non-
represented counterparts.169 Parent representation at the EPC hearing also 
ensures the presence in the courtroom of those who can advocate for 
placement options, which may help obviate trauma to children.170 
Additionally, parent representation ensures that there are advocates 
available to those in Minnesota who are at significantly greater risk of 
encountering Minnesota’s child protection system because of race and 
poverty.  
A.  Other States’ Statutory Systems of Parent Representation 
New York, much like the Court in Stanley v. Illinois, acknowledged 
that while a parent has a right and important interest in raising their child, 
the child also maintains interests that are at risk when this bond is scrutinized 
by the court.171 New York statutorily requires the appointment of counsel to 
parents who cannot afford such counsel by the time of the initial hearing.172 
New York is one of seven states that mandate the appointment of counsel 
by statute for both termination and dependency proceedings.173 New York 
specifically found that if parents are unrepresented in child protection 
matters, their due process rights are violated.174 Given the state’s express 
statutory provision calling for representation of assigned counsel for parents 
lacking financial means to afford such counsel, New York’s highest court 
determined that the lack of parental representation also denies 
unrepresented parents equal protection of the laws.175 
Because New York has long-recognized parents’ rights to counsel, 
New York led the charge on significant social reform in child protection. 
Both the Bronx Defenders and the Center for Family Representation (CFR) 
provide free legal representation to parents involved in child protection 
proceedings.176 The goal of the Bronx Defenders is to provide advocacy for 
indigent clients to address the underlying issues which cause people to come 
                                                           
168 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 87, at 6. 
169 Id. 
170 MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 93, at 9.  
171 Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A 
False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 63, 69–70 
(1995). In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court recognized that the state “needlessly risks 
running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child” when examining 
those bonds through procedures with a presumption of unfitness. 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972). 
172 N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 262 (McKinney 2012).  
173 SANKARAN & POLLOCK, supra note 99, at 2–25.  
174 In re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 357 (1972). 
175 Id. 
176 AM. BAR ASS’N, SUMMARY OF PARENT REPRESENTATION MODELS 11 (2009). 
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into contact with the legal system.177 In fiscal year 2018, only four percent of 
children whose parents were represented by the Bronx Defenders were 
ultimately placed in stranger foster care.178  Additionally, New York 
discovered that the mandatory appointment of counsel, as well as other 
programs offered by the CFR, saved taxpayers nearly $37 million since 
2002.179 
B.  Fiscal Considerations Behind the Mandatory Appointment of 
Counsel 
Mandating the appointment of counsel to parents in child 
protection proceedings provides opportunities for the state to save costs 
from a myriad of sources. This includes savings in foster care costs, savings 
in litigation costs, and costs saved by not requiring the court system to spend 
additional time and effort working with unrepresented parents.180 As 
discussed above, Minnesota has one of the largest populations of short 
stayers in the nation.181 Mandating counsel to parents in child protection 
proceedings could save the State considerable capital, as evidenced by two 
case studies in New York and Washington.182 In general, states have 
discovered that parental representation in child protection proceedings 
leads to improved case planning, expedited permanency, and cost-savings 
to the government.183  
i.  The New York State Example 
New York has similarly saved its taxpayers significant money by 
providing representation to parents in child protection proceedings. The 
CFR began providing free legal services to parents in 2002.184 CFR has been 
instrumental in keeping children from entering foster care unnecessarily, to 
the benefit of the state’s taxpayers. The Minnesota Children’s Justice 
                                                           
177 Id. at 1.  
178 Family Separation in New York City: Hearing Before the New York City Council Justice 
System Committee 12 (2018) (statement of Emma Ketteringham, The Bronx Defenders). 
179 CTR. FOR FAM. REPRESENTATION, Mission & History, https://www.cfrny.org/about-
us/history-mission/ [https://perma.cc/4C7N-9Y9F]. 
180 See, e.g., Bobbie J. Bridge & Joanne I. Moore, Implementing Equal Justice for Parents in 
Washington: A Dual Approach, 53 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 31 (2002) (finding that strengthening 
parents’ access to counsel increased family reunifications by fifty percent. Additionally, “the 
enhancement of parents’ representation has the potential to save . . . millions in state funding 
on an annualized basis.”). 
181 Church & Sankaran, supra note 141, 219–20.  
182 See infra Part V.B. 
183 See, e.g., Thornton & Gwin, supra note 167, at 139.  
184 CTR. FOR FAM. REPRESENTATION, Mission & History, https://www.cfrny.org/about-
us/history-mission/ [https://perma.cc/H9HF-5AAT].  
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Initiative found that CFR saved New York $3,107,662 in foster care and 
litigation costs during an eight-month period between 2007 and 2008.185 
Since 2007, CFR additionally saved New York taxpayers money by either 
reducing the amount of time children spent in foster care or by avoiding 
foster care entirely.186 In 2011 alone, CFR prevented seventy-three percent 
of its clients’ children from entering foster care.187 Considering the children 
who did enter care, the median length of stay in foster care by children 
whose parents were represented by CFR equaled 2.2 months, a stay 17.7 
months shorter than the median in the state of New York.188 CFR also 
determined that the cost of keeping one child in foster care in New York is 
$30,000 each year.189 CFR’s services only cost $7,100 per family, and the 
provision of such services has reduced the cost of foster care in the state by 
$48.5 million.190  
ii.  The Washington State Example 
Washington state mandates court-appointed counsel to indigent 
parents.191 In 2000, Washington launched the pilot Parent Representation 
Program to provide state-funded attorney representation to indigent 
parents.192 Program results indicate that shortening the time it takes for 
children to achieve permanency can potentially save the state millions in 
dollars.193 One study of the program determined that if all 8,231 children in 
the Washington study cohort who eventually reunified had reunified one 
month sooner, the state would have saved $3 million in foster care 
maintenance payments alone.194  
 More importantly, when represented by public defenders in 
Washington, parents and children achieved reunification eleven percent 
faster than unrepresented parents in the state.195 The eleven percent 
decrease in reunification times translates to twenty-seven days each child did 
not spend in foster care.196 The Parent Representation Program ultimately 
                                                           
185 MEYER, supra note 37, at 11.  
186 CTR. FOR FAM. REPRESENTATION, supra note 161. 
187 CTR. FOR FAM. REPRESENTATION, THE CENTER FOR FAMILY REPRESENTATION 1 (2015). 
188 ELIZABETH THORNTON, COURT-BASED CHILD WELFARE REFORMS: IMPROVED 
CHILD/FAMILY OUTCOMES AND POTENTIAL COST SAVINGS, AM. BAR ASS’N, CTR. ON 
CHILD. & THE LAW 10 (2012). 
189 Our Results, CTR. FOR FAM. REPRESENTATION, https://www.cfrny.org/about-us/our-
results/ [https://perma.cc/MK54-RWQE].  
190 Id.  
191 WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.092 (2000).  
192 Thornton & Gwin, supra note 167, at 6. 
193 Id. at 7. 
194 Id. at 7–8.  
195 Id. at 7. 
196 Id. 
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led to a thirty-nine percent increase in reunification rates in the thirty-four 
counties that implemented the program.197 Ultimately, when reunification 
was not possible, parental representation also led to adoptive placement or 
guardianship nearly one year sooner when compared to cases where parents 
were unrepresented.198 
As indicated by the results in other states, Minnesota could save 
capital by reducing the state’s short-stayer population and the unnecessary 
money spent on the out-of-home placement of children who are returned 
to their parents less than thirty days after removal. By having attorneys 
represent parents at the initial EPC hearing, the attorney can advocate for 
the child to remain in the care of his or her parent or guardian in situations 
in which it is safe to so advocate. Any money saved from the reduction in 
the state’s short-stayer population could then be used to support appropriate 
structural changes to Minnesota’s representation practices. The United 
States Department of Health and Human Services stated that changes to 
structural best practices in parent representation are needed to ensure high-
quality representation to parents and families.199 The Department 
recommended that States:  
[1] Support adequate payment and benefits to 
“professionalize” this type of law practice, and move from 
a contract system with competing priorities to an 
employment system like other indigent and state agency 
representation[; and] 
[2] Support a payment system for parent and child 
representation that is designed to promote high quality, 
ethical legal representation and discourages overly large 
caseloads.200 
These are likely recommendations from which Minnesota could 
directly benefit. As discussed in Part III, and according to the 2008 
Children’s Justice Initiative Report, there is no statewide standard of 
practice for attorneys representing parents.201 Statements made by in-state 
                                                           
197 Id.  
198 Mark E. Courtney, Jennifer L. Hook & Matt Orme, Evaluation of the Impact of Enhanced 
Parental Legal Representation on the Timing of Permanency Outcomes for Children in 
Foster Care, 1 PARTNERS FOR OUR CHILD. 1, 6 (2011). 
199 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ACYF-
CB-IM-17-02, HIGH QUALITY LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ALL PARTIES IN CHILD 
WELFARE PROCEEDINGS 13 (2017).  
200 Id.  
201 MEYER, supra note 37, at 3. As indicated above, the Public Defender’s Office continues 
to represent children older than ten in child protection proceedings, as public defenders are 
statutorily required to represent children. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subdiv. 3(a)–(b). 
However, the Board reports that they are overwhelmed and working with resources below 
those designated by national standards. Infra Part III. The Board additionally reported that 
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lawyers indicate that no such standardized practices have materialized in the 
ten years since public defenders ceased representing parents.202 After the 
dissolution of state funding for parent representation in 2008, individual 
counties determine what minimal practice standards, if any, apply to 
parental representation in their own jurisdictions.203 Such patchwork 
practices—the vestiges of Lassiter—created a lack of consistency in parental 
representation across Minnesota’s eighty-seven counties. Adopting the 
standards suggested by the Department of Health and Human Services 
would help create more consistency in child protection proceedings across 
Minnesota. 
The 2008 Children’s Justice Initiative Report also provided an in-
depth analysis of attorney payment by county.204 Such payment schemes 
varied widely by county. Some counties reported attorney payment as low 
as $24 per hour, with a reported maximum hourly payment of $100 per 
hour.205 Other counties reported paying attorneys on a flat-fee basis 
depending on the type of proceeding, and others still reported contracting 
with attorneys for monthly sums.206 Several counties reported having only 
two attorneys appointed to handle the county’s entire child protection 
caseload.207 While this information is, at this point, a decade old, no other 
published reports have collected this breadth of information regarding 
attorney payment schemes by county in Minnesota. Regardless, it is unlikely 
the system of contract payments adopted by Minnesota in 2008 is the system 
of compensation the Department of Health and Human Services 
envisioned when it recommended a system of adequate payment and 
benefits to “professionalize” the practice of parent representation.  
More important than fiscal considerations, timely access to counsel 
for parents in child protection proceedings may: contribute to a more 
expeditious provision of appropriate and individualized services to families; 
assist in placing children with relatives rather than in stranger foster care; 
                                                           
the starting salary at the Public Defender’s Office and the maximum salary both fall between 
eleven and twelve percent below those of employees in comparable public agencies. MINN. 
BD. OF PUB. DEF., supra note 56, at 7. In 1999, Washington state discovered that there were 
severe disparities between counties in compensation provided to attorneys representing 
indigent parents. Courtney et al., supra note 198, at 1–2. The Washington legislature 
believed that such disparity in payment called into “serious question whether parents in 
Washington were being provided adequate legal representation in processes that have 
significant consequences for parents and children[.]” Id. at 2. In New York, it was noted that 
attorneys would leave child protection practice because they were receiving inadequate pay. 
Thornton & Gwin, supra note 167, at 10. 
202 AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 52. 
203 MEYER, supra note 37, at 2.  
204 Id. at 25 (noting that, after the dissolution of the statewide system of payment, almost every 
county that had agreed to pay for attorney’s fees had only done so under protest).  
205 Id. at 7. 
206 Id.  
207 Id. at 26–27.  
31
Zuehlke: Minnesota's System of Justice by Geography in Child Protection Pr
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
478 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
prevent unnecessary removals of children; and avoid unnecessary court 
proceedings. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Representation by competent counsel in a child protection 
proceeding is integral to preserve both parents’ and children’s fundamental 
liberty interests. Section 260C.163 of the Minnesota Statutes affords broad 
and legislatively unguided judicial discretion with respect to the decision to 
appoint counsel to parties in child protection proceedings. The 
appointment of counsel is an important right of both the parent and the 
child when considering the magnitude of the intrusion by the state into the 
sphere of family life. According to sound public policy arguments and 
national trends in representation, Minnesota should reform section 
260C.163 of the Minnesota Statutes to mandate counsel for parents at the 
beginning of a child protection case, before the first appearance at an 
Emergency Protective Care Hearing. As noted in the beginning of this 
Article, at the time of publication, the legislature is considering amending 
the language of the statute to mandate counsel before the first hearing in a 
child protection matter. This proposed change does not affect Minnesota’s 
families that were separated without representation. However, this change 
is necessary, and provides the path forward.  
Minnesota’s child protection system is struggling. Our state public 
defenders—who are statutorily required to represent children in child 
protection matters—are overwhelmed by daunting caseloads and lack of 
financial support. Children continue to be removed from their homes at 
higher rates, and our state’s public defenders believe Minnesota will only 
continue to remove children in greater numbers. This increase in the 
number of children removed continues to disproportionately affect 
Minnesota’s families of color as well as families experiencing poverty, who 
are least able to protect themselves against state intrusion.  
Minnesota must not turn a blind eye to its struggling parents when 
the integrity of its families and the well-being of its children are at stake. It is 
not a partisan issue to protect Minnesota families from state intrusion after 
a call to child protection has been made. Further, it is not a partisan issue to 
mandate parents counsel before the first Emergency Protective Care 
hearing, where mistakes can have long-lasting effects on the outcome of the 
case, the placement of the child, and the child’s well-being. It is unjust that 
in Minnesota, these mistakes—which have grave consequences for families—
are allowed to occur without attorney representation.  The presence of 
qualified and culturally competent counsel before the first appearance at the 
Emergency Protective Care hearing and at all stages of a child protection 
proceeding is the start of the journey toward better outcomes in child 
protection matters for Minnesota families. 
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